Since June 25, 1941, Finland has been at war with the USSR and since December 5, 1941 with Great Britain. Accordingly, during 1941 - 1944. was a military ally of Germany. In connection with the defeats of the German army in 1943 on the Eastern Front and the active preparation of British and US troops for landing in Western Europe, in the spring of 1944 Finland began to look for ways to conclude a truce with its opponents - the USSR and Great Britain. As a result, in September 1944, Finland not only concluded a truce, but also began limited military operations against the German army on its territory.
Since 1943, Germany had already assumed that Finland would go over to the side of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Winter 1943 - 1944 German troops in northern Finland prepared routes and plans for retreat to Norway.
On September 3, 1944, the Finnish command ordered its troops to begin deployment to begin combat operations against German troops in Finland.
On September 4, units of the 26th Army and 18th Mountain Corps of the Wehrmacht began to withdraw from Finnish territory to Norway. Together with them, but only to Sweden, 56,500 Finns were evacuated, fearing the entry of the Red Army into the interior of Finland. Refugees drove 30,000 head of livestock to Sweden.
Finnish refugees are driving livestock to Sweden. Rovaniemi, September 1944
On September 11, the German and Finnish commands agreed on the peaceful nature of the withdrawal of German troops from Finland according to the plan outlined in the negotiations and on transport provided by the Finnish side.
The German command, contrary to agreements with the Finnish side, tried to maintain its positions in Finland by force.
On September 15, German troops (2,700 people led by Captain 2nd Rank Karl Conrad Mecke ( Karl Conrad Mecke)) tried to take possession of the island of Gogland in the Gulf of Finland. Finnish garrison (1612 people led by Lieutenant Colonel Martti Miettinen ( Martti Juho Miettinen), 42 guns, 6 heavy mortars and 24 machine guns) not only repelled the attack of the German landing force, but forced him to surrender. The losses of the Finnish troops were 37 killed, 15 missing and 68 wounded. The losses of the German troops were 155 killed and 1231 prisoners. The German landing flotilla (40 ships) lost 9 ships. The attempt to seize the island of Gogland caused a wave of anti-German sentiment in Finland.
On the same day, Finland declared war on Germany. This was determined not only by the attack of German troops on the Finnish garrison of the island of Hogland, but also by the terms of the truce with the USSR, which was confirmed by the 2nd paragraph of the Moscow Peace Treaty of September 19, 1944, according to which Finland pledged to disarm German ground, sea and air forces forces remaining in Finland after September 15, 1944, and transfer their personnel to the USSR as prisoners of war. The fulfillment of this point logically led Finland to the start of hostilities against Germany, which began at the end of September 1944. In Finland, this military campaign was called the “Lapland War” ( Lapin sota).
The Finnish group of troops (60,000 people) in Lapland was led by Lieutenant General Hjalmar Fridolf Siilasvuo ( Hjalmar Fridolf Siilasvuo). She was opposed by German troops (213,000 people) under the command of Colonel General Lothar Rendulic ( Lothar Rendulic)
On September 28, near the town of Pudasjärvi, a Finnish battalion tried to capture the bridge over the Olhavanioki River, but German sappers resisted and blew up the crossing. During the battle, two Wehrmacht soldiers were killed, and two were captured. The Finns lost five people killed.
On October 1, 1944, Finnish troops (12,500 people) landed troops in the port of Tornio on the Swedish-Finnish border.
October 2 German troops (7000 people, 11 captured French tanks Somua S35) attacked the positions of Finnish troops in the vicinity of Tornio. The Finns retreated, but captured 30 Wehrmacht soldiers.
Destroyed tanks Somua S35 near Tornio. October 1944
On October 3, the German Air Force bombed the port of Tornio. The losses of the Finnish troops were 2 ships, 3 killed and 20 wounded. The German command ordered the capture of 262 hostages from among local residents and demanded their exchange for 30 German prisoners of war captured by the Finns on October 2.
On October 4, the German Air Force bombed Tornio. The losses of the Finnish troops were 60 killed and 400 wounded.
Finnish infantry near Tornio. October 1944
On October 4-8, German troops unsuccessfully attacked Tornio. The losses of the German troops were 600 killed and 337 prisoners. Losses of Finnish troops - 376 killed.
The city of Rovaniemi after the departure of German troops. October 1944
On October 13, the German command issues an order according to which, when retreating, German troops must use scorched earth tactics, destroying cities and villages, blowing up bridges and railways.
On October 17, Finnish troops entered Rovaniemi.
On October 26 - 30, the Finnish 11th Infantry Regiment carried out a series of attacks against the SS Mountain Regiment Reinhard Heydrich near the village of Munio, after which the latter retreated. Losses of Finnish troops - 63 killed. Losses of German troops - 350 killed.
At the end of October 1944, Finland began demobilizing its army. There were 12,000 Finnish soldiers and officers left in Lapland with 800 machine guns, 100 mortars and 160 artillery pieces. They did not conduct active military operations against German troops, who were gradually retreating to Norway.
During the period of hostilities from September 1944 to April 1945, Finnish troops lost 774 people killed, 262 missing and 3,000 wounded. German troops lost 950 killed, 2,000 wounded and 1,300 prisoners.
Ahto S. Aseveljet vastakkain. Lapin sota 1944 - 1945. Helsinki, 1980.
Finland as an enemy of the USSR in World War II: the formation and evolution of the “enemy image” in the consciousness of Soviet society in 1939-1940 and 1941-1944.
Mass consciousness is an extremely complex and contradictory phenomenon; elements of social psychology, moral and ideological attitudes are intertwined in it. At the same time, it represents a synthesis of phenomena rooted in national traditions, in the everyday life of people, with ideological attitudes purposefully formed by power structures.
War as an extreme state of society in its opposition to external forces makes special demands on the mass consciousness. In war conditions, the morale of the army and the people is of particular importance, in the formation of which a combination of factors plays an important role: conviction in the just nature of the war, faith in the ability of the state to repel an enemy attack despite all difficulties and even temporary failures, the presence of spiritualand moral values for which citizens of the country are ready to become soldiers and give their lives.
The ideological and psychological components in any war are closely interconnected. The goal of any war is victory, and it is impossible to achieve it without a certain moral and psychological state of the country’s population in general and its army in particular. At the same time, both the people and the army must be convinced of their, first of all, moral superiority over the enemy and, of course, in the final victory over the enemy. All this applies not only to mentalities, but also to the area of the actual mass moods and feelings of the people. However, as you can see, the semantic content of these psychological phenomena belongs to the sphere of ideology. Therefore, any moral and psychological preparation for war, as well as ensuring a certain morale during its course, is carried out primarily by ideological means and tools.
The most important among them is the propaganda of the official motivation for the war. Each war has its own ideological design, a unique ideological motivation, which can be expressed both in the official definition of war by the highest political and ideological institutions, and in direct slogans used in propaganda work among the troops.
In Soviet times, social revolutionary motives, closely related to the doctrinal principles of Marxism and communist ideology in a broad sense, began to play a large role in the ideological formulation of the war. However, despite the fact that the motivation for these wars usually included terminology that was an echo of the idea of world revolution, behind most of them there was, first of all, the actual state interest.
The ideological component acquired particular significance in the mass consciousness under the established Stalinist regime. This fully applies to the consciousness of Soviet people during the Second World War. And the local Soviet-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940. and the Continuation War (as the Finns call the military operations against the USSR in 1941-1944) should be considered precisely in this global historical context.
The Soviet-Finnish military confrontation is very fertile material for studying the formation and evolution of the image of the enemy as a phenomenon of mass consciousness. There are several reasons for this. First of all, any phenomenon is best known by comparison. Opportunities for comparison in this case are opened by the very development of the Soviet-Finnish conflict, its historical division into two unequal parts.
First — the so-called Winter War (1939-1940) - a clash between a huge power and a small neighboring country in order to solve its geopolitical problems.
The real motive for it was the military-strategic considerations of the Soviet leadership: the close proximity of the state Soviet-Finnish border to Leningrad, the second largest city in the USSR, the most important military-industrial center and seaport, as well as the “cradle of the revolution.” The desire of the Soviet government to push back the border with Finland was in the pan-European framework of the relations between the three major subjects of world politics that had emerged by that time - fascist Germany and its satellites - on the one hand; countries of “Western democracy” - on the other, and the USSR - on the third. The war with Finland turned out to be just one of the events in the general series of measures taken by the USSR to move west (the campaign in Western Ukraine and Belarus, the annexation of Bessarabia, Bukovina and the Baltic countries). The Soviet government was naturally concerned about the active military preparations of Finland, which suggested the formation of a powerful military bridgehead against the USSR on its territory (the construction of a series of military airfields by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, the creation of a powerful system of long-term fortifications - the “Mannerheim Line”, etc. .). The Soviet-Finnish negotiations on mutual security issues, launched at the initiative of the USSR in 1939, did not lead to success. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 created a fundamentally different situation in Europe, including in relation to Finland: in a secret annex to this treaty it was classified as part of the sphere of Soviet influence 1 . The Soviet government considered the situation in which the main potential enemy of the USSR, Nazi Germany, on the one hand, was bound by a just concluded non-aggression pact, and on the other, involved in real military operations against the Western powers, a favorable moment for untying old foreign policy knots and increasing the level of security of the country by moving the western border along almost the entire line from south to north, from the Black Sea to the Baltic. The southern section of the Soviet-Finnish border closed the northern part of this line. Although officially the war was defensive in nature, in fact on the part of the USSR it was aggressive, since it was aimed at seizing part of foreign territory, although an unambiguous assessment of it, due to the international situation and the role of Finland in it, is impossible.
In terms of scale and theater of operations, it was a local war; it was fought on Finnish territory. In terms of the participants, the war was two-sided. The course and outcome of this war is known. It ended with the signing of a peace treaty, and on conditions much more favorable to the USSR than those put forward by it before the outbreak of hostilities. At the same time, the USSR managed to force Finland to give up part of its strategically and economically important territories at the cost of disproportionately large casualties. Over the 105 days of the war, the total losses of Red Army personnel, according to official data, reached 391.8 thousand people, of which about 127 thousand were irrecoverable. There are other estimates according to which Soviet losses exceed this official figure by more than 1.2 times, and for every Finn killed, five Soviet soldiers died 3. According to Finnish sources, the human losses of Finland in the war of 1939-1940. amounted to 48.2 thousand people. killed and 43 thousand wounded. According to other officialAccording to other sources, the Finnish army lost 95 thousand people killed and 45 thousand wounded 4.
The international resonance of this conflict is also known: started in the context of the unfolding World War II, it evoked associations with the German invasions of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland and led to the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations as an aggressor. All this should have affected the mutual perception of direct participants in the hostilities on both sides. From the point of view of the Finns, it was, of course, a just war, and they fought with great patriotism, fiercely and skillfully, especially since the battles took place on their territory. The Soviet people, including soldiers, still had to justify why the “big” should offend the “small”.
The propaganda campaign in the USSR for the purpose of moral and psychological mobilization of the population in preparation for war was large-scale and massive. Its essence is reflected in numerous reports in Soviet newspapers of that time. Let us cite, as an example, the headlines of only two of them - “Red Star” and “Leningradskaya Pravda” for November 27-29, 1939. 5 They contain accusations of the Finnish side of provoking a conflict to explain and motivate the “response actions” of the USSR: “Brazen provocation of the Finnish military ", "The warmongers will not escape responsibility", "Repel the presumptuous raiders!", "The provocateurs will be in trouble!", "Down with the war provocateurs!", "We will destroy the enemy if he does not come to his senses", "Teach the bandits a lesson!", "Quiet maddened pea buffoons”, “We will not allow the Finnish military to keep Leningrad under threat”, “Respond with a triple blow!”, etc. A number of headlines were devoted to the “public attitude” to the position of the Soviet and Finnish authorities, with the thesis “We approve of the foreign policy of the USSR ” was supplemented by the statement “The Finnish people condemn the policies of the puppet government,” and the feelings of “anger and indignation” were supplemented by the practical conclusion: “They are always ready to go into battle.” Other headlines outlined the prospect: “The great Soviet people will sweep away and scatter the insolent warmongers into dust,” “War mongers willbits,” etc. All these slogans were supported by statements about Soviet power: “The Soviet Union is impregnable,” “The Land of the Soviets is invincible,” “The Red Army is an invincible force,” “We are ready to defeat the enemy on his own territory.”
And here is what the official justification of the Soviet position looked like in a radio speech on November 29, 1939 by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.M. Molotov: “The hostile policy of the current Finnish government towards our country forces us to immediately take measures to ensure external state security... Confused in our own anti-Soviet ties with the imperialists, [it] does not want to maintain normal relations with the Soviet Union ... and take into account the requirements of the non-aggression pact concluded between our countries, wanting to keep our glorious Leningrad under military threat. From such a government and its reckless military, one can now only expect new brazen provocations. Therefore, the Soviet government was forced to declare yesterday that from now on it considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Finland and which is being irresponsibly violated by the Finnish government” 6.
The tone and argumentation of Soviet official propaganda is well reflected in the poem by Vasily Lebedev-Kumach “The Hour of Reckoning is Near,” 7 published the next day, November 30, 1939, in the Izvestia newspaper. It was published in the same issue of the newspaper as Molotov’s speech, and in fact was its figurative and poetic illustration in order to enhance the emotional impact on the reader. What the head of government could not afford (although he was not particularly shy in his expressions) was fully embodied in his work by the official poet-propagandist, who carried out a very specific political order. Speaking on behalf of the people and at the same time addressing them, V. Lebedev-Kumach began with ritual flattery towards the Soviet leaders(« We are strong through Stalin's hardening and truth....»), mentioned the “full wisdom” of Molotov’s speech. Next comes, with one hundredron, emphasizing the justice of the Soviet position, and on the other hand, blaming, humiliating and even insulting the Finnish leadership. Having summarized the “fundamental attitude of the USSR”(« We never wage war when we are wrong, / We are the first enemies of robbery and capture! »; « We are happy to respect any people of the earth…»), the poet argues for the aggressive actions of the Soviet side, trying to present them as forced and fair (“ We We don’t want war, but we must protect / The peace of our borders - both shores and waters»; « Keep our glorious Leningrad under fire / We will not let the corrupt, impudent pack!»; « But let him not dare to threaten us with weapons, / The government of jesters and general trash!» etc.). The second half of the poem is an alternation of ongoing insults (“warriors-provocateurs”, “traitors”, “mad dogs”, “bloody jesters”, etc.) with threats(« And we will shed lakes of your black blood!»; « The hour of reckoning is near! It's coming soon!») , in which the main argument is power and strength, the inexhaustibility of resources (« Our Union is huge and its anger is enormous!») . This “sample” of artistic propaganda ends with the certainty of a split between the authorities and the people of Finland(« You meanly want to destroy your people, / But the people of Suomi will understand your meanness!»). But these hopes were not destined to be justified, and the Finnish people put up very fierce resistance to the superior enemy forces.
However, it should be noted that with all the overlaps of Soviet propaganda, the real psychological and official ideological motivations in the Soviet-Finnish war basically coincided. In a very difficult international situation, in the context of the Second World War, the Soviet government was really concerned about the problem of border security, especially in such an important part as the area adjacent to Leningrad. Here is what N.S. Khrushchev subsequently wrote about this in his memoirs: “There was an opinion that Finland would be presented with ultimatum demands of a territorial nature, which it had already rejected at the negotiations, and if it did not agree, then military action would begin. Stalin had this opinion... I also believed that this was correct. It’s enough to say loudly, and if they don’t hear, then shoot from a cannon, and the Finns will raise their hands and agree with our demands... Stalin was confident, and we also believed, that there would be no war, that the Finns would accept our proposals and thereby we would achieve our goal without war. The goal is to protect us from the north... Suddenly they called that we had fired a shot. The Finns responded with artillery fire. In fact, the war began. I I say this because there is another interpretation: the Finns fired first, and therefore we were forced to respond... Did we have the legal and moral right to such actions? Of course, we had no legal right. From a moral point of view, the desire to protect ourselves and come to an agreement with our neighbor justified us in our own eyes” 8 .
This position of the USSR was not accepted by the world community. On December 14, 1939, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution on the “exclusion” of the USSR from the League of Nations, condemning its actions directed against the Finnish state as aggression. On December 16, Pravda published a TASS report on this matter, which said: “The League of Nations, by the grace of its current directors, has turned from some kind of “instrument of peace,” which it could have been, into a real instrument of the Anglo-French military bloc to support and incite war in Europe. With such an inglorious evolution of the League of Nations, its decision to “exclude” the USSR becomes quite understandable... Well, so much the worse for the League of Nations and its undermined authority. Ultimately, the USSR may still be the winner here... The USSR is no longer associated with the League of Nations pact and will henceforth have free hands” 9 . The final phrase of this statement about “free hands” must be seen in a complex international context in which a diplomatic and at the same time strategic game was being played with many players. In it, one of the active parties was fascist Germany with already defined allies, on the other, the Anglo-French-American, not yet fully formed coalition, and on the third, the USSR, forced, due to the behind-the-scenes intrigues of the “Western democracies,” to come to an agreement with Hitler in order to push back the impending “big war” at least for a while.
The fragility of the legal and moral grounds for considering the war with Finland fair for the USSR could not but have a very contradictory effect on the mood of the Soviet troops participating in it. The range of opinions was very wide - from doubts about the legality of the actions of the Soviet side to the frankly cynical position according to which “might is always right.” Thus, the report of the Political Directorate of the Leningrad Military District to the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army L.Z. Mekhlis dated November 1, 1939 speaks of systematic work to clarify issues of the international and internal situation in parts of the district “through conversations, reports, lectures, readings and consultations.” “The mood of the personnel of all units in connection with the report of Comrade Molotov (at the V extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. - E.S.) and the editorial article of Pravda dated November 3 - combat” 10, the report states. However, following this statement, the following facts are given, indicating that these sentiments were not so clear:
“Red Army soldier 323 art. regiment Chikharev says: “Finland did not accept the peace proposals of the USSR and thereby made it clear that it did not want friendship. If necessary, we will advance the border from Leningrad not only by tens, but also by hundreds of kilometers”...
Junior commander of the 54th division. zen art director Polin said in a conversation: “Why should the USSR insist on demands in negotiations with Finland regarding territory, because Finland also needs this territory. She hasn’t fired at us for 20 years, and if she does fire, she’ll shoot and stop. We didn’t give up the heights of Zaozernaya to the Japanese. Are our demands aggressive?”
Based on these statements, Comrade Letunovsky, the military commissar, held a conversation with special attention to a new formulation of the question of aggression” 11.
In general, propaganda had a strong influence on the Soviet people, including those in the active army. Even when faced with real enemy strength and heavy losses, Soviet soldiers remained confident in victory, relying, in particular, on the stereotype of the balance of forces between a great power and a small country. Here, for example, are lines from a letter from junior lieutenant M.V. Teterin to his wife dated December 27, 1939: “You probably read in the newspapers for 24/KhP about the results of military operations in Finland over three weeks, where everything is described in detail. As you can see, there are already quite a few casualties, including about 9 thousand wounded. This is probably noticeable here in Petrozavodsk, too, since you, Katya, write that you were already on duty at the hospital. But it’s okay, don’t lose heart, victory will still be ours and the “booger” won’t defeat the elephant” 12.
The longer the war lasted, the weaker the impact of ideological cliches became and the more critical reality was perceived. At the same time, respect for the enemy grew, and one’s own overwhelming superiority in strength was perceived in a different, dramatic context. All this was reflected in the letter of the Red Army soldier P.S. Kabanov to his family dated March 1, 1940, where in one short phrase a wide variety of feelings were mixed - despair, and fear of dying, and a high assessment of the enemy’s fighting qualities, and a weak hope of surviving, but only because there are much more of us than enemies: “Despite the fact that the Finns are excellent shooters, they won’t kill us all here...” 13. Of course, they didn’t kill everyone, but the Red Army soldier Kabanov himself died a few days later...
The attitude towards this war in the Soviet rear was far from clear, despite all the activity of propaganda influence. Rumors leaking from the front about the course of military operations, our losses, and the behavior of the Finns significantly diverged from newspaper reports, which forced people to think and reevaluate existing stereotypes and attitudes. For example, in the diary of A.G. Maikov, who lived in one of the villages in the vicinity of Leningrad, on January 14, 1940, the following entry was made, which actually recorded a respectful and sympathetic attitude towards the enemy: “Women in queues talk about Finland like this: “Small, but remote.” " 14 . The author of the diary himself, on the day the war ended, March 13, 1940, expressed his assessment of its results: “...One thing is obvious: the war, even if it was won strategically at the cost of terrible losses, was politically lost shamefully...” 15 . Thus, at the front and in the rear, the influence of propaganda had far from an absolute influence on mass creation.knowledge of Soviet citizens who retained the ability to assess reality very soberly and critically.
Probably, the uncertainty and lack of convincingness of the initial motivation for the Soviet position in the Winter War prompted a shift in propaganda from the thesis of “ensuring the security of Leningrad” to emphasizing only the liberation goals of the Red Army in relation to Finland. Class ideas of “liberation from exploitation” with the help of Soviet bayonets were reflected in newspaper headlines of reports of numerous rallies of USSR workers “in support of decisive measures” of the Soviet government. Recent terminology about “fascists” has left the Soviet propaganda lexicon due to its flirtation with Nazi Germany. Expressions such as “White Finnish bandits”, “Finnish White Guard”, “White Finland”, etc. became propaganda cliches. To be fair, it should be noted that similar propaganda was carried out in Finland, where during the anti-Soviet campaign Finnish workers were called upon to fight against “Bolshevik fascism” 16 .
Naturally, the Finnish side also ideologically justified its participation in the Winter War, which was reflected primarily in the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces K.G. Mannerheim on the start of military operations against the USSR: “Valiant soldiers of Finland!.. Our centuries-old enemy again attacked our country... This war is nothing more than a continuation of the liberation war and its last action. We are fighting for our home, for faith and for the Fatherland” 17.
Of course, ordinary combatants on both sides did not think in terms of government directives and command orders, but the latter, of course, left an imprint on the everyday perception of the enemy. Ideological layers are present in all cited official documents, with class motives dominating on the Soviet side, and nationalist and geopolitical motives on the Finnish side. At the same time, the formula of Mannerheim’s order that the Finns were fighting for their home and for their Fatherland was still closer to the truth and understanding of the Finnish soldier than the strained formulations about the threat to the huge USSR from a small neighbor.
Of course, one must take into account the rather great effectiveness of Finnish propaganda on its population, which appealed to feelings of patriotism and the justice of the defensive war. However, Finland’s position in the war and its propaganda were also not absolutely effective and flawless. Doubts about the need to fight with a huge, powerful neighbor over a relatively small piece of land arose even among the devoted soldiers of the Finnish army. This is what was written in the war diary of junior sergeant Martti Salminen on February 12, 1940: “... It occurred to me: is it really necessary to fight? I knew that the USSR demanded Finnish territories for its security in the fall. Based on the fact that the Finnish government chose a war against a huge people rather than a territorial concession, then, apparently, the Soviet proposals were excessive (as I later learned, these proposals were acceptable). I compared the enemy's weapons with ours. The enemy had a lot of artillery, it couldn’t be compared with ours. I knew that somewhere in the rear behind our positions there were several Finnish guns that rarely fired due to a lack of shells; I saw hundreds of enemy planes, but not a single one of our own. The enemy had countless tanks, but I didn’t see a single Finnish one during the entire war... I hated military propaganda. We were made to believe that the enemy army was just a bunch of people dressed in rags. However, in practice it turned out that the Russian uniform was better than ours: a warm padded jacket, felt boots, and overcoats made of thick cloth. Only a few Finns had felt boots. I hated propaganda not only because it was false, but also because it weakened morale. If they believed in this, then no even more or less decent person would shoot at a helpless enemy...” 18 . Thus, in the Winter War, Finnish propaganda was as far from reality as the Soviet one, and its motivation was in many ways vulnerable.
Second phaseThe Soviet-Finnish conflict is fundamentally different. Taking the side of German fascism, which attackedThe USSR and Finland themselves turned into an aggressor. Of course, she is again trying to present her participation in this war as fair, as an attempt to return the taken lands. The order of the same Mannerheim in June 1941 accuses the USSR as an aggressor, questions the sincerity and constancy of the peace concluded after the Winter War, which “was only a truce,” and calls on the Finns to go “on a crusade against the enemy in order to provide Finland with a reliable future". However, the same order contains a hint of this future - to Greater Finland right up to the Ural Mountains, although here so far only Karelia appears as the object of claims. “Follow me one last time,” Mannerheim calls, “now that the people of Karelia are rising again and a new dawn is dawning for Finland” 19. And in the July order, he already directly states: “Free Karelia and Great Finland flicker before us in a huge whirlpool of world-historical events” 20.
Therefore, the statement of Professor Jukka Nevakivi of the University of Helsinki that “if not for the Winter War, in which we lost a tenth of our territory, Finland, perhaps, would not have become Hitler’s ally in 1941, preferring the neutrality of the “Swedish option”, does not sound entirely sincere. . The Finnish army moved that summer only to take away what had been taken away” 21.
Although there is some truth in his assessment: by unleashing military operations against a sovereign neighbor on November 30, 1939 and winning a Pyrrhic victory over it at the cost of huge losses, the Stalinist leadership thereby predetermined its position in the coming big war, turning a probable or even unlikely enemy into an inevitable one. No insult to the national pride of another people can go unpunished. And Finland rushed at the recent offender, not caring too much aboutabout what dubious company she found herself in.
However, the matter was not limited to the “return of what was taken away.” Having reached the old Soviet-Finnish border, the Finnish army, without hesitation, moved further, occupying territories it had not previouslyowned. Finnish propaganda claimed that Jaanislinna (Petrozavodsk), and then Pietari (Leningrad) would belong to Finland, that Greater Finland would stretch east to the Urals, “throughout its entire historical territory” 22 . Although - there is such evidence - the Finns really were more willing to fight on those lands that they lost in 1940.
The official guidelines of the Finnish leadership about the fairness of their participation in the war were completely consistent with the public atmosphere. This is how former Finnish officer I. Virolainen recalls the mood of the Finnish public in connection with the start of the war against the USSR: “A certain great national upsurge arose and a belief arose that the time had come to correct the injustice done to us... Then the successes of Germany blinded us so much that all Finns edge to edge lost their minds... Rarely did anyone even want to listen to any arguments: Hitler started the war and that was already right. Now the neighbor will feel the same thing that we felt in the fall of 1939 and the winter of 1940... In June 1941, the mood in the country was so inspired and stormy that whatever the government was, it would be very difficult for it to keep the country from war » 23.
However, now the Soviet people felt themselves to be victims of aggression, including from Finland, which had entered into a coalition with Nazi Germany. The Great and Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was for Soviet soldiers no matter on what front and against what specific enemy they fought. It could be Germans, Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Finns - the essence of the war did not change: the Soviet soldier fought for his native land.
Finnish troops took part in this war on the front, which the Soviet side called Karelian. It ran along the entire Soviet-Finnish border, that is, the battlefields largely coincided with the theater of military operations of the Winter War, the experience of which was used by both sides in new conditions. But on the same front, German units also fought alongside the Finns, and, according to many testimonies, the combat effectiveness of the Finnish units, as a rule, was much higher. This is explained both by the already mentioned psychological factors (assessment of the war as fair, patriotic enthusiasm, inspiration, desire for revenge, etc.), and by the fact that most of the personnel of the Finnish army had combat experience, tolerated the northern climate well, and knew the specific features terrain. It is characteristic that Soviet soldiers on the Karelian Front rated the Finns as an enemy much higher than the Germans and treated them “more respectfully.” Thus, cases of capture of Germans were not uncommon, while the capture of a Finn was considered a whole event. One can also note some features of Finnish tactics with the widespread use of snipers, deep raids into the Soviet rear of ski sabotage groups, etc. On the Soviet side, the experience of the Winter War could have been used less, since its participants were mainly among the personnel command personnel, as well as those called up to army of local natives.
Fighting continued in the North between Soviet and Finnish troops for three years, until September 1944, when Finland withdrew from the war, concluding a truce with the USSR and Great Britain and declaring war on its former ally, Germany. This event was preceded by major successes of Soviet troops along the entire Soviet-German front, including an offensive on the Karelian Front in June-August 1944, as a result of which they reached the state border, and the Finnish government turned to the Soviet Union with a proposal to begin negotiations.
It is to this period, associated with the offensive of the Soviet troops and Finland’s exit from the war, that the documents we discovered from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense date back to.
The first of them provides Soviet intelligence data on the mood in the Finnish army in July 1944, as well as excerpts from the testimony of prisoner of war Captain Eikki Laitinen. The second tells about the circumstances of his capture and interrogation, but not in the dry style of a military report, but in the vivid language of a newspaper essay, authored by Soviet captain Zinovy Burd. These documents provide us with a unique opportunity to look at the same event through the eyes of two opponents who fought on the same sector of the front in the same military rank and met face to face in battle.
The first document is characterized by both the self-assessments of the Finnish side and the conclusions of the Soviet command made on this basis about the moral and psychological state of the Finnish troops shortly before Finland left the war (June-July 1944). By this time, the mood of the Finns had clearly changed, as evidenced by the soldiers' letters. The turning point in the war, the retreats, including on the Soviet-Finnish sectors of the front, clearly influenced the mood in the troops. However, a Soviet colonel who analyzed the documents concludes that “the morale of the Finnish troops has not yet been broken, many continue to believe in the victory of Finland. The preservation of combat readiness is also facilitated by the fear that the Russians are supposedly barbarians who seek the physical destruction of the Finnish people and their enslavement" 24 .
These fears are evidenced by an excerpt from a letter from one unknown Finnish soldier: “... Most of all I am afraid of falling into the hands of the Russians. It would be the same as death. After all, they first mock their victims, who then face certain death” 25. It is interesting that among Soviet soldiers there was also a widespread opinion about the special cruelty of the Finns, so being captured by them was considered even worse than by the Germans. In particular, the facts of the destruction of Soviet military hospitals by Finnish sabotage groups along with the wounded and medical personnel were well known 26 .
The Finns were also characterized by a differentiated attitude towards the civilian population of the territories they occupied along ethnic lines: cases of cruel treatment of Russians and a very loyal attitude towards Karelians were common. According to the regulations of the Finnish occupation military administration of Eastern Karelia on concentration camps dated May 31, 1942, they were supposed to contain primarily persons “belonging to the non-national population and living in those areas where their stay during hostilities is undesirable,” and then all those who are politically unreliable 27 . Thus, in Petrozavodsk, according to the recollections of former juvenile prisoner M. Kalinkin, “there were six camps for the civilian Russian population brought here from the regions of Karelia and the Leningrad region, as well as from the front line. While representatives of the FinnishUgrians remained free during these years” 28. At the same time, Finns, Karelians and Estonians were classified as persons of Finnish nationality (suomenheimot), and all others were considered non-indigenous peoples (vieratheimot). In the occupied territory, local residents were issued Finnish passports or residence permits - a single form, but of different colors, depending on their nationality 29 . Active work was carried out to finance the indigenous population, while it was strongly emphasized that the Russian population in Karelia has no roots and has no right to live on its territory 30 .
A feature of Finnish psychology was a great attachment to native places. This also affected the nature of the fighting. Thus, the captured captain Eikki Laitinen testified: “...When our regiment was leaving the Malitsky Isthmus, the soldiers went into battle with less desire than now, because for the Finnish soldier Eastern Karelia is less important than its own territory. On the territory of Eastern Karelia, soldiers entered into battle only when ordered. Near the village of Suoyarvi, when we had already passed our old borders, the soldiers of my company sent a delegation to me with a request to stop the offensive. This is understandable, since a large number of soldiers in my company are natives of the regions of Lake Ladoga who wanted to defend their homelands. About a week ago two soldiers deserted from my company, but after a few days they returned and reported that they wanted to atone for their guilt in battle. I didn’t punish them” 31.
The biographical data of this Finnish officer, a participant in both wars, was awarded two crosses, the first of which he received on the Karelian Isthmus in 1940 for “valiant defense”, and the second in 1942 for “valiant offensive”. This information is given in article 3. Burda, which also mentions the wife of the captured captain - a military doctor, a member of the Shutskor organization "Lotta-Svyard", also awarded two crosses 32.
Therefore, we can trust the testimony of this officer, who held himself with dignity during interrogation when he discussed the influence of the Winter War on the Finnish attitude not only to their eastern neighbor, but also to the idea of socialism as a whole. “The Finnish opinion about the USSR, about socialism, communism has changed a lot over the past 10 years,” he says. — I I am sure that if 10 years ago the soldiers of my company had to fight against the Red Army, they would all run over to your side. The reason that their views have now changed is the events of 39-40, when the Russians started a war against Finland, as well as the Russian occupation of the Baltic countries, by which they proved their desire to enslave small nations ... "33
Soviet propaganda, as a rule, sought to paint an extremely unsightly image of the Finnish enemy. Even on the basis of the interrogation materials of Captain E. Laitinen partially described above, judging by which he proved himself to be a respectable captive officer, in the Red Army newspaper “Battle Path”, in a note entitled “Lapland Crusader”, a front-line correspondent portrayed him caricaturedly and evilly. “Thrice despicable Lapland crusader”, “seasoned enemy of the Soviet Union”, “White Finnish occupier”, “convinced fascist”, “Shutskorite”, “hater of everything Russian and Soviet” - such epithets he was awarded, and even the word “ppotskor” is the name of the Finnish detachments of territorial troops - it was perceived among them as a curse word. However, the Finns in their propaganda also did not mince words when talking about the USSR, the Bolsheviks, the Red Army and Russians in general. The dismissive nickname “Russi” (something like our “Kraut” in relation to the Germans) was common in the Soviet Union. But this is not surprising: in wartime, harsh statements addressed to the enemy are the norm of behavior, justified not only ideologically, but also psychologically.
It should be noted that in general, in the public consciousness of the Soviet side, the Finns were perceived as a secondary enemy, who did not stand out in any way among other members of the Hitler coalition, while on the Karelian front, in areas of direct contact with them, they acted as the mainThis was a very dangerous enemy, whose fighting qualities pushed even the Germans into the background. All other allies of Germany could not boast of respect for themselves from the enemy: neither the Hungarians, nor the Romanians, nor the Italians with whom the Soviet troops had to deal were not particularly valorous and were, by all accounts, rather “flimsy warriors.”
Let us present several opinions about the Finns as an enemy, obtained not only from “synchronous” (wartime documents), but also from “retrospective” sources - records of military memoirs, as well as interviews with participants in the Soviet-Finnish and Great Patriotic Wars conducted in 1990s.
“They are warriors, they fought well. They were a small company, but they killed a lot of our people,” 34 admitted a participant in the Soviet-Finnish war, Toivo Matveevich Katgonen, by the way, himself a Finn by nationality, who volunteered to join the Red Army in 1939. Another front-line soldier, a participant in the fighting on the Karelian front, Yuri Pavlovich Sharapov, recalled: “In the summer of 1944, we came up against the tenacity of Finnish soldiers in defense... They resisted desperately... Finn could sit behind a boulder and shoot. And until you go to his rear and shoot him in the back of the head, he will not leave the place” 33. A veteran of both wars, in the first he commanded a platoon, in the second - a battalion, and now retired Colonel General Dmitry Andreevich Krutskikh, when asked “What is your opinion of Finnish soldiers?” answered: “As soldiers, the Finns are very good, and in the Great Patriotic War they fought better than the Germans. I I see several reasons for this. They knew the terrain and were prepared for the climatic conditions in which they fought. This led to minor differences in camouflage, tactics, and reconnaissance, which ultimately bore fruit. Fire training - workshop. In battle - stable. But I noticed that when they attacked our defense, they cheerfullymoved up to 100-150 meters, and then lay down..." 35. Recalling the ceasefire after the truce in the Finnish campaign on March 13, 1940, D.A. Krutskikh describes the behavior of recent opponents as follows: “When we left, we were ordered to blow up all the defenses and fill up the trenches. The Finns were ordered to move 100 meters away from the road. We burned bonfires, sang songs, played the harmonica. They played harmonicas. I saw that they waved their hands at us and threatened us with their fists. Well, we answered them accordingly...” 36 This simple and everyday observation - “they threatened us with their fists” - very accurately reflects the atmosphere of that time: despite the declaration of peace, even then it was clear that the showdown with the closest neighbor was not yet over...
Of particular interest is evidence about the behavior of Finnish prisoners of war in both wars. For example, T.M. Kattonen recalled one incident from the winter of 1940: “I don’t remember the name of the island that was stormed. Some of the Finns were captured, but overall there were few prisoners. All the Finnish prisoners who came to us were terrible, they were ready to eat us. I I questioned one, questioned him, and then he suddenly jumped into the water - there, into the Gulf of Finland, right in the place where we almost drowned. They caught him by the collar anyway and dragged him back. He didn’t look at the fact that the water was icy, he didn’t want to give up...” 37. In the diary of A.G. Mankov there was an entry dated December 11, 1939, indicating that rumors about the unusual behavior of captured Finnish military personnel were spreading even in the Soviet rear: “From one student, whose husband was a doctor at the front, he learned that the captured Finns do not want to eat. Her husband doesn't know what to do with them. How fatally this diverges from newspaper information!” 38. Thus, already in the Winter War, the special resilience of the Finns in captivity is noted, which manifested itself later, in the Continuation War, of which numerous evidence has been preserved. Let's give just oneAn example is the story about the events of the end of 1942 by Daniil Fedorovich Zlatkin, an officer of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 19th Army: “The Finns came across... The Germans sent them to us for reconnaissance. We captured three Finns, but got nothing from them... Whatever methods we used on them, nothing. Very persistent, very strong people, and good soldiers. The Germans, when captured, instantly tell everything, absolutely everything, or they are cunning, trying to deceive us, there were cases... And these... They answered willingly about themselves, about their family. But as soon as the question concerned military operations, the number of troops, the unit number, the names of the commanders, it was dead. He directly stated: “You won’t get anything from me. I won’t tell you anything.” Laconically, without any... The Germans said:"I I don’t want to betray my oath!”, they said so pathetically, pathetically. And he simply said openly: “I won’t tell you this!”... I then concluded that they are very brave, resourceful, have excellent knowledge of the terrain, their camouflage is brilliant, and besides, they are disciplined soldiers, selflessly devoted to their duty , and you need to learn how to fight from them” 39.
Highly appreciating the fighting qualities, training and equipment of the Finns, veterans at the same time always mention their inherent cruelty. “There were many cases of atrocities when the Finns killed our wounded with knives, whom they did not have time to remove from the battlefield,” former artilleryman Mikhail Ivanovich Lukinov wrote in his memoirs about the Winter War. “I myself saw through binoculars how in a clearing, which it was impossible to get close to because of the shooting cuckoos, there were several bodies of our soldiers lying. And when one of them tried to get up, shots were fired at him from the trees in the forest. One of the wounded said that when after the battle he was lying wounded in the snow, a Finn drove up to him and said in Russian: “Are you lying down, Ivan? Well, lie down, lie down.” It’s still good that he didn’t finish him off, but there were many such cases...” 40 Similar stories can be heard in the memories of the battles on the Karelian front of 1941-1944. Thus, D.F. Zlatkin spoke about a hospital that was completely slaughtered when part of it was surrounded (“There were over 150 people there, and they all cut them off... The wounded bedridden, doctors, nurses, their throats were calmly cut!” 41), about insidious mines- traps, about saboteur skiers, knife throwers, usually aiming at the back, and, of course, about the same legendary “cuckoo” snipers...
“Cuckoos” is a special topic. Recently, many, primarily Finnish researchers, have questioned their existence, considering them one of the military myths 42 . Thus, Ohto Manninen claims that “no one has met such veterans who would remember how they climbed trees... It seems unlikely that a soldier could be forced to climb a tree, because he should always have the opportunity to retreat. Getting down from the tree would take too much time." 43 However, in the memoirs of Soviet participants in both wars, references to “cuckoo” snipers are found as an obligatory element, and with reference to personal experience: “Cuckoos” were there! Don’t believe it when they say that they weren’t there - it’s the same as saying that we had machine guns (during the Finnish war. - E.S.) I I personally filmed the “cuckoo” at 600 meters. They lie that they were scouts, not snipers. They were a disaster for us...” 44 (D.A. Krutskikh); “The “cuckoos” were still “cuckooing” at the top... They had snub-nosed boots, he would jump from a tree onto his skis and that’s it... I remember once they caught a “cuckoo”, took him down, and started interrogating him. He says:"I I killed nine Muscovites, I should have killed ten.” I tell him: “Here’s a blast for you!” You won’t be able to kill me!” He looks at me, sees that I am [also] Finnish, and he gets even more angry. Then I began to ask him: “Why did you climb a tree to kill us?” “We must kill,” he says. - Killed nine. Ten should have been killed, but I didn’t have to...” And he already had a bullet ready for me. Ten Muscovites... “Muscovites” they called us...” 45 (T.M. Kattonen).
Among the stories about “cuckoos” there are also almost fantastic ones, in which echoes of the propaganda of that time are clearly visible. For example, the mention of “suicide bombers” left by their own people to certain death. “We were very annoyed by the “cuckoos” - snipers from the trees,” recalled M.I. Lukinov. — When retreating, the Finns put them in trees with a machine gun and a large supply of ammunition. Some of them, after shooting, ran away on skis, which they left under a tree. Others beat to the last, until they themselves were knocked out of the tree, and those who fell were finished off with hatred. Sometimes four “cuckoos” were located, as it were, in the corners of a forest square, and then everyone who got into this square inevitably died. But it was difficult to shoot them down, because during such attempts they concentrated the fire of four machine guns on one target. At night they changed position, moving to the next “square”. When putting some snipers in trees, the Finns took off their shoes so they wouldn’t run away, replacing their shoes with a blanket. There was a case in our regiment when soldiers, seeing a “cuckoo” sitting on a tree, fired at it. And she immediately threw the machine gun and the blanket off her feet. The “cuckoo” turned out to be a young girl, red-haired, pale as death. They took pity on her, and when they put her in some burnt felt boots, she realized that they would not kill her, and she began to sob. Hearts melted, and she was sent untouched under escort to the rear...” 46 Let us note that Finnish historians categorically deny the existence of female snipers in the Winter War. M.I. Lukinov describes not only the circumstances of the captivity, but even the external signs of the captured girl... Is this military myth-making or a real story? Is the veteran conveying what he heard from other people’s words or talking about what he saw with his own eyes? After all, in other similar stories we find a lot of details, as well as the names of witnesses and participants in the events...
It is noteworthy that when talking about their former Finnish opponents, Soviet veterans often find justification for their actions. When the conversation is about German enemies, nothing like this happens. Let us quote a fairly typical statement on this subject by D.F. Zlatkin: “We, of course, had colossal losses from the Finnish army. They were terribly cruel. They couldn't help usprobably forgive the long-term possession of Finland by our kings and, besides, the year 39-40, of course, made the Finns so angry... They had colossal losses. And we had even greater losses than they did. But they defended their land, but what about us? Why did we go there? What did this give us? It's a shame, that's all... I I condemn them for their cruelty, but they defended themselves too. Just as Soviet soldiers defended themselves from the Germans, from enemies, they defended their piece of land from the same enemies, as they believed, our Soviet troops..." 47
Such references to the negative experience of the Winter War occur constantly. And if the Finns themselves call the military actions against the USSR in 1941-1944. A continuation war, then Soviet veterans trace a clear relationship between the two stages of the armed confrontation with Finland, experiencing a more or less obvious guilt complex for that first war. “One of the features of this war was that we fought on orders,” reflects M.I. Lukinov. “It was not like in the subsequent Patriotic War, when we hated the enemy who attacked our Motherland. Here we were simply told: “March!” - without even explaining where and why. During the Finnish war, we simply fulfilled our military duty, only then understanding the meaning and necessity of military action. At first we did not have hatred for the Finns, and only then, seeing individual cases of atrocities on the part of the enemy, did our soldiers sometimes become imbued with anger towards him. Like, for example, they frantically killed “cuckoos” that were causing us great harm...” 48 . D.A. Krutskikh spoke even more harshly and generally: “What can I say aboutFinnish war... In political terms - loss, in military terms - defeat. The Finnish war left a heavy mark. We've seen enough grief. We suffered very heavy losses - nothing compared to their losses. The dead remained lying on foreign soil... Although the Finnish company was considered victorious, we front-line soldiers knew its price... "49.
And one more characteristic feature. In memoirs of the Great Patriotic War, there are often attempts to compare the behavior of the Finns during the Winter War and during the fighting on the Karelian Front. Very indicative in this regard are the front-line notes of Konstantin Simonov about the offensive of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus in the summer of 1944. Talking about the rapid capture of Vyborg (“In the forties, during the Finnish war, all this took three months of fighting with heavy casualties, and now only eleven days with relatively small losses on our part...”), he notes: “We must pay tribute to the Finns - they have not changed, they remained the same persistent soldiers that they were. We just learned to fight” 50. And here he mentions his conversations with front-line soldiers: “One of the officers says that the Finns are not used to fighting in the summer. A dispute begins about the Finns - whether they are the same or not as they were then. One says that they are not at all the same as they were, the other - also a participant in the Finnish war - says that they are the same ones, they fight no worse, it’s not all about them, but about us. Probably right..." 51 . Then K. Simonov cites the opinion of General N. G. Lyashchenko, who “says about the Finns that they are, as they were, brave warriors. But in these battles it turned out that they were extremely sensitive to detours. As soon as he pierced them, he went to their rear - they were lost!” 52.
But even this “confusion”, noted by many, “every day more and more stupefied by what is happening,” 53 which engulfed the Finnish army during the period of the successful Soviet offensive, did not make the Finns a less serious adversary. According to Yu.P. Sharapov, at the end of July 1944, when our troops reached the state border and crossed it, going deep into Finnish territory up to 25 km, they received an encrypted message from the General Staff with an order to return immediately, since negotiations had already begun Finland's exit from the war. But they had to fight their way back with stubborn fighting, since the Finns were not going to let them go. Comparing this situation with the situation on other fronts, the progress of the liberation mission and the subsequent imposition of socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe, Yu.P. Sharapov notes: “We, those who fought in the North, treated this differently. As soon as the code came not to let us into Finland, we immediately realized that the matter smelled of kerosene, that there was nothing for us to do there, because there would be a war there all the way to Helsinki. If they were fighting in the forest, and it was necessary to shoot in the back of the head so that the Finn would stop shooting because of this boulder, then you can imagine what would have happened when we moved on and covered another 240 kilometers. Here both Stalin and his entourage understood that there was no need to get involved with anyone, but with the Finns. These are not Germans, not Romanians, not Bulgarians and not Poles...” 54.
Among all Germany's satellites, perhaps only Finland had an element of justice for participating in the war against the USSR, which, however, was completely covered by its aggressive plans. Interestingly, the motivation for entering the war and leaving it was almost the opposite. In 1941, Mannerheim inspired the Finns with plans to create a Greater Finland and swore that he would not sheathe his sword until he reached the Urals, and in September 1944 he made excuses to Hitler for the fact that “he could no longer afford the kind of bloodshed that he suffered.” the continued existence of little Finland would be in danger” and would condemn its 4 million people to extinction 55 . The delusions of grandeur have passed. And the cure for this disease was our successful offensive, which drove the Finns back to their pre-war borders.
* * *
In conclusion, it should be noted that the perception of Finland as an enemy of the USSR in World War II went through a long and serious evolution, associated both with numerous propaganda stereotypes and even myths rooted in class ideology, and with the real course of historical events, which included two stages of direct military confrontation. Initial submissions from the late 1930s. about Finland as a small, backward, weak country, where the “White Finns” established themselves in power, oppressing the working people of Suomi, who only dreamed of freeing themselves from the yoke of the exploiters with the help of their eastern neighbor - the workers' and peasants' state and its mighty Red Army and was ready to the first shots to rise to the revolutionary struggle, to overthrow the “puppet government” and establish Soviet power, or, in any case, not to provide any serious resistance to their “liberators” - all these illusions were dispelled in the very first days of the Winter War of 1939-1940 . The assessment by the Soviet Government and the military command of the capabilities of the Red Army in the context of the impending war was also not entirely adequate, the reasons for which were analyzed after its end - at the Meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the commanding staff to collect experience in combat operations against Finland on April 14-17, 1940 d. Here is what J.V. Stalin said about this in his speech: “What especially prevented our troops from adapting to the conditions of the war in Finland? It seems to me that they were especially hampered by the previous psychological campaign created in the troops and command staff - let’s throw our hats in the air. The Polish campaign harmed us terribly; it spoiled us. Entire articles were written and speeches were made that our Red Army was invincible, that there was no equal to it... This prevented our army from immediately understanding its shortcomings and rebuilding, rebuilding in relation to the conditions of Finland. Our army did not understand, did not immediately understand that the war in Poland was a military exercise, not a war. She did not understand and did not understand that in Finland there would not be a military walk, but there would be a real war. It took time for our army to understand this, to feel it, and for it to begin to adapt to the conditions of the war in Finland, so that it began to rebuild itself” 56.
Thus, the obstacle to an adequate assessment of the enemy was ideological cliches - both ideological and practical, based on the limited experience of the Civil War, as well as a clear overestimation of one’s own forces while underestimating the potential and morale of the enemy. The Winter War was actually the first real modern war that the country waged after the end of the First World War. “...Our modern Red Army,” Stalin noted, “was shelled on the fields of Finland, - this is its first baptism. ...And our army emerged from this war as an almost completely modern army...” 57. At the same meeting, having paid tribute to the high combat capability of the Finnish army, Stalin also noted its main shortcomings - the inability to carry out large offensive actions and passivity in defense, as a result of which such an army “cannot be called modern.” This was the official point of view on the results of the Winter War with Finland, which was expected to continue in the near future. And these assessments contained both our own correctness and new mistakes, overestimation of our own strengths and underestimation of the enemy. The Red Army really received a baptism of fire, a bitter and instructive experience, but not yet in a modern war and with an enemy of unequal potential. The authorities overestimated the significance of the Winter War for increasing the combat readiness of the army, but did not learn all the necessary lessons. At the same time, the huge blow dealt to the self-esteem and pride of the “invincible Red Army” forced us to take Finland very seriously in the future as an enemy and not make previous mistakes in assessing its capabilities. That is why the Karelian Front, which largely coincided with the theater of military operations of the Winter War, turned out to be the most stable during the Great Patriotic War, even in its most difficult periods.
During the Continuation War, the perception of Finns both in the army and in Soviet society was more adequate than on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. It was, in essence, the same enemy, the clash with which was repeated after a short period of time, but the Soviet side - the “subject of perception” - was already in many ways different, “enriched” with the experience of previous military operations, got rid of many ideological clichés and prejudices. Perhaps it was the adequacy of mutual perception in the context of the course of the Second World War, taking into account, of course, the general international situation, that allowed the USSR and Finland to find a mutually acceptable way out of the military confrontation. Moreover, of all Germany’s allies bordering the USSR, only Finland was not subjected to Soviet occupation and “Sovietization”, acquiring the unique status of “her"trail-friendly" state (in the sphere of Soviet influence) for many decades of the Cold War.
Of course, the dramatic experience of the military confrontation between the USSR and Finland very significantly influenced the mass consciousness of the peoples of the two countries in the context of their mutual perception. However, in the relations of Russians towards the Finns - and this is a very interesting socio-psychological phenomenon - there has never been the mass hatred that characterized the attitude towards the Germans during the Second World War and for many years after its end. Perhaps there was a certain complex of guilt for the events of 1939-1940, when a small country became a victim of aggression from a large neighbor, as well as respect caused by the steadfastness of the Finns with which they defended their land. It is likely that the neutral-friendly status of post-war Finland, which was also supported by Soviet propaganda, also had an impact on the perception of this country and its people in subsequent years. The experience of two wars has taught the peoples of our countries a lot, and I would like to hope that the historical lessons are firmly learned and will be taken into account by future generations.
Notes:
1 See: The eve and beginning of the war: Documents and materials. L., 1991. P. 192; Secret additional protocols to the non-aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR of August 23, 1939 // Military archives of Russia. 1993. Vol. 1. P. 115.
2 The classification has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Statistical research. M., 1993. S. 99, 407; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces. Statistical research. M., 2001. pp. 195, 595. On different pages of both official publications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, data on the total losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war differ: in a special section dedicated to this war, the figure is 333,084 people, but adding up the numbers of irretrievable (126,875) and sanitary (264,908) losses, which are given in the final table for each book, the figure is 391,781 people.
3 Pharmacist P. What losses in manpower and equipment did the Red Army suffer in the Finnish campaign? // Homeland. 1995. No. 12. P. 98.
4 See: Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. P. 212.
5 Quoted. by: Welcome us, beautiful Suomi! “Liberation” campaign in Finland 1939-1940. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 2000, pp. 26-27.
6 On both sides of the Karelian Front 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995. P. 7.
7 All quotes from it are given in the edition: Receive us, Suomi beauty! “Liberation” campaign in Finland 1939-1940. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 2000. P. 224.
8 Khrushchev N.S. Memories // Ogonyok. 1989. No. 30. P. 11.
10 Quoted from: Soviet Union: years of testing. The Great Patriotic War. M. 1995. P. 29.
12 Receive us, beautiful Suomi! Part 1. St. Petersburg, 2000. P. 195.
13 Ibid. P. 198.
14 Ibid. P. 189.
16 Semiryaga M.I. The Unfamous War // Ogonyok. 1989. No. 22. P. 28-30.
17 On both sides of the Karelian Front 1941-1944. P. 11.
18 War diary of Martti Salminen. Per. from Finnish // Receive us, beautiful Suomi! “Liberation” campaign in Finland 1939-1940. Part 2. St. Petersburg, 2000. P. 139.
19 Receive us, beauty Suomi! Part 2. P. 60.
20 Ibid. P. 70.
22 On both sides of the Karelian front. P. 261.
23 Ibid. pp. 67-68.
24 TsAMO RF. F. 387. Op. 8680. D. 17. L. 85.
26 On both sides of the Karelian front. pp. 190-191. Right there. P. 242.
27 On both sides of the Karelian front. P. 259.
28 Ibid. pp. 248, 266.
29 Ibid. pp. 156-169, 184-186, 191-193, 198-199, 206-208, 250-251, 264-266.
30 TsAMO RF. F. 387. He. 8680. D. 17. L. 86.
32 TsAMO RF. F. 387. Op. 8680. D. 17. L. 86.
33 From an interview with T.M. Katgonen, a participant in the Soviet-Finnish war. Recording and literary adaptation by Bair Irincheev. Published on the website “I Remember”: http://www.iremember.ru/infantry/kattonen/kattonen_r.htm.
34 From an interview with Yu.I. Sharapov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War on the Karelian Front, May 17, 1995. Recording and literary processing by E.S. Senyavskaya // Personal archive of the author.
35 From an interview with D.A. Krutskikh, a participant in the Soviet-Finnish and Great Patriotic Wars. Recording and literary processing by A.V. Drabkin. Published on the website “I Remember”: http://www.iremember.ru/mfantry/krutskikh/krutskikh r.htm and krutskikhvo V. html.
37 From an interview with T.M.Kattonen.
38 Welcome us, beautiful Suomi! Part 1. St. Petersburg, 2000. P. 189.
39 From an interview with D.F. Zlatkin, a participant in the Great Patriotic War on the Karelian Front, dated June 16, 1997. Recording and literary processing by E.S. Senyavskaya // Personal archive of the author.
40 From the memoirs of M.I. Lukinov, a participant in the Soviet-Finnish and Great Patriotic Wars. Published on the website “I Remember”: http://www.iremember.ru/artillerymen/lukinov/lukinov2_r.htm.
41 From an interview with D.F. Zlatkin.
42 Manninen O. So were there “cuckoos”? // Homeland. 1995. No. 12. P. 80; Stepanov V.N. Legends and myths of the Soviet-Finnish war // Questions of history. 1997. No. 3. P. 171-173.
43 Manninen O. Decree. Op. P. 80.
44 From an interview with D.A. Krutskikh.
45 From an interview with T.M.Kattonen.
46 From the memoirs of M.I. Lukinov.
47 From an interview with D.F. Zlatkin.
48 From the memoirs of M.I. Lukinov.
49 From an interview with D.A. Krutskikh.
50 Simonov K. Different days of the war. Writer's Diary. M., 1975. P. 385.
51 Ibid. P. 389.
52 Ibid. P. 390.
54 From an interview with Yu.P. Sharapov.
55 On both sides of the Karelian front... P. 525-526.
56 Winter War 1939-1940. Book 2. J.V. Stalin and the Finnish campaign. (Transcript of the meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)). M., 1998. pp. 275-276.
57 Winter War 1939-1940. Book 2. J.V. Stalin and the Finnish campaign. P. 280.
FINLAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Winter War, 11/30/1939 - 3/13/1940
The first stage of the Russo-Finnish War was the so-called “Winter War” from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, which began after Finland refused to accept the conditions of the Soviet Union on the transfer of areas of Finnish territory along the southeastern border. What really decided the fate of this conflict was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The speech of Prime Minister A. Kaiander on November 23, 1939 clearly shows the Finnish point of view on this matter.
The Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939 at 06.50 - without declaring war, attacks from the ground along the border and aerial bombing of Finnish cities). The government was replaced by a puppet regime called the "Terijoki government." Finnish Foreign Minister Weinz Tanner spoke to American listeners on the radio after the attack on December 3, 1939 in a radio broadcast. Soviet troops initially advanced far into Finnish territories (except for Karelia, where Finland had an organized line of defense, the so-called "Mannerheim Line". The Finns resisted stubbornly. In one of the battles, several units of the Soviet troops were destroyed, their equipment was captured. The local residents helped a lot, who confidently acted in small groups in the forests. After Finland withstood the first attacks, the Soviet Union replaced the commanders leading the attack, as well as combat tactics.Since the Soviet Union had absolute superiority in aviation, artillery and manpower, the defense on the Karelian Isthmus gradually weakened, which forced the Finns to retreat to reserve lines.
Finland was only able to hold the front while peace negotiations resumed. As it became obvious that no external help would arrive, Finland was forced to accept the difficult peace terms dictated by the Soviet Union. As a result, Finland lost a tenth of its territory, but retained its independence. This campaign ended on March 13, 1940. The Winter War may have contributed to the German attack against the Soviet Union by giving a false impression of Soviet military strength.
Continuation War, 25.6.1941 - 4.9.1944
The second war is called the "Continuation War" - in it the Finns fought on the German side from June 25, 1941 to September 4, 1944. There are several reasons for this war - all of them are disputed in Finland, as there are several theories about this. The main reasons were the "Winter War" (the Finns hoped for the return of lost areas), distrust of Soviet intentions, and the belief that Germany could win the war.
It is unlikely that the Finns had a real choice (but that is history) after what happened earlier and what happened during the Second World War. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Finnish troops joined German troops to organize attacks in the North with the aim of capturing Murmansk. Finland did not declare war on the Soviet Union and did not begin hostilities until the Soviet Union began bombing Finnish territory (cities) on the morning of June 25, 1941. As a result, Finnish Prime Minister Rangell, declared and was supported by parliament that Finland was now at war with Soviet Union.
Finland then joined the attack on June 30 to capture areas previously annexed by the Soviet Union in the Winter War and was able to achieve that goal in the first stage of the war. In some areas, Finnish troops crossed the border with the USSR in winter to gain an advantage and occupy geographically advantageous positions (waterways, lakes, etc.). However, the Finns refused to participate in the siege of Leningrad. The so-called attack phase of the Continuation War lasted until the end of 1941.
In early 1944 it became obvious that Germany had lost the war and Finland, and the Soviet Union had some contacts regarding ending the war, but no agreement was reached.
The Soviet Union tried to “convince” Finland with the so-called “Peaceful Bombings” - in February 1944, they bombed the city of Helsinki. The bombings failed, thanks to a reliable defense and air defense system
The Soviet Union tried by all means to restore the situation on the Karelian Isthmus - June 9, 1944 (this was intended to accompany the Allied attack on Normandy). A massive attack was capable of breaching the Finnish defenses at Valkeasaari on 10 June, and the front retreated quickly to the secondary defense line (Vammelsuu-Taipale line). The fighting was fierce. Soviet tanks and infantry, supported by massive artillery and bombers, bombarded the Finnish defenders. As the fighting continued, the VT line was breached at Sahakyla and Kuuterselka 14.644 and after a major counter attack at Kuuterselka by the Finnish branch failed, the defense was forced retreat again. The main loss during this period was the capture of the city of Viipuri by the Soviets on 20 June.
Finnish troops were able to stop the Soviet attack on the Tali-Ihantala region, where the worst happened from June 25 to July 6. By this time, the Finnish Army had enough artillery and troops equipped with the new German anti-tank weapons and was capable. Soviet losses in tank and human resources were quite large.
At the same time, the Soviets tried to bypass Finnish defenses by crossing Viipurinlahti (the bay) through a chain of islands. This attack began on July 4th and was a brutal amphibious battle that lasted until July 10th. The third main attempt by the Soviets began on July 4, on the Vuosalmi (crossing the Vuoksi River; however, the troops did not advance further than the shore as they were fired upon by Finnish artillery along with Finnish air force bombers and German aircraft. Finnish infantry also participated in the operation. The Soviets stopped attacks on July 11 and began to the reorganization of troops on the Karelian Isthmus.
At the end of the summer the front was stabilized, but Finland saw that peace with the Soviet Union was the only way to avoid accusations of collusion with the Germans. The armistice with the Soviet Union began officially 07:00 - September 4, 1944, although Soviet forces continued to fire until 7:00 the next morning.
The temporary peace between the Soviet Union and Finland was ratified in Moscow on September 19, 1944, and the final peace agreement was signed in Paris on February 10, 1948. As a result, Finland was forced to pay huge payments to the Soviet Union.
Lapland War, 27.9.1944 - 27.4.1945
The third war was called the "Lapland War" and was a struggle against Germany after the armistice with the Soviet Union. Finland really did not want to fight the Germans, but under pressure from the Allies (mainly the Soviet Union) was forced to engage in a real fight with the Germans until April 27, 1945.
Another old entry of mine made it to the top after 4 whole years. Today, of course, I would correct some of the statements from that time. But, alas, there is absolutely no time.
gusev_a_v in the Soviet-Finnish War. Losses Part 2
The Soviet-Finnish War and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through minefields, in dense rows and holding hands. Every Russian person who recognizes the incomparability of losses must at the same time admit that our grandfathers were idiots.
I’ll quote Finnish Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim again:
« It happened that in the battles of early December, Russians marched singing in tight ranks - and even holding hands - into Finnish minefields, not paying attention to explosions and accurate fire from the defenders.”
Can you imagine these cretins?
After such statements, the loss figures cited by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24,923 Finns killed and dying from wounds. Russians, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.
Why feel sorry for these Russians?
Finnish soldier in a coffin...
Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book “The Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940.” with reference to Nikita Khrushchev they give the following data:
“Of the total number of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR’s losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1000 aircraft, 2300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment... "
Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with “meat”.
Finnish military cemetery...
Mannerheim writes about the reasons for the defeat as follows:
“In the final stages of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower.”
Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such scanty losses, Finland began to lack manpower?
Something doesn't add up!
But let's see what other researchers write and have written about the losses of the parties.
For example, Pykhalov in “The Great Slandered War” states:
« Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded. The primary source of this figure is a translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä published in the newspaper “Abroad” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish publication “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost more than 23,000 people killed in the “winter war”; more than 43,000 people were injured. 25,243 people were killed in the bombings, including on merchant ships.”
The last figure - 25,243 killed in bombings - is questionable. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to familiarize myself with the Finnish original of Seppälä’s article.”
Mannerheim, as you know, assessed the losses from the bombing:
“More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice that number were wounded.”
The largest figures for Finnish losses are given by Military Historical Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official data, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.”
And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
According to Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 prisoners
As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book “Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Loss." The number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet includes even those with whom their relatives broke off contact in 1939-1940.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers counted these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Red Army soldiers examine captured Boffors anti-tank guns
Who and how counted the Finnish losses is absolutely unclear. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the armed forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war Finland was experiencing a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even minor losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the Vanquished,” Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to Aritz's calculations, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 grew by 238 thousand people!!!
At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves down to people aged 45, something that had never happened in any country, not even Germany.”
Funeral of Finnish skiers
What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. On Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses during the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
A total of 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish website http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died between 1939 and 1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not add up.
Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR” claims that ardent Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army losses. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as the Shutskor, were not included in the general loss statistics. And they had many paramilitary forces.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.
"Fighters" of the "Lotta" formations
Be that as it may, two explanations arise:
First, if the Finnish data about their losses is correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they “raised their paws” without suffering almost any losses.
The second is that if we assume that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply vastly underestimated their own losses.
Last month, the Finnish Defense Forces released an archive of 160,000 photographs from the Second World War. These are photographs from 1939-1945, describing the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union of 1939-1940, the military actions of Finland when it became an ally of Nazi Germany in the war against the Soviet Union of 1941-1945, and the Lapland War - military actions between Finland and Germany in September 1944 - April 1945.
All captions were short and in Finnish, so some inaccuracies may occur.
The swastika is one of the most ancient and widespread graphic symbols. From 1918 to 1945, the swastika was depicted on the banners of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces, and currently on the presidential standard.
Snowmobile with propeller and swastika, Haapasaari, Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Flamethrower in action. In the forest near the village of Niinisalo in Finland, July 1, 1942. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Waiting for approaching enemy aircraft. This incredible device is an acoustic locator. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Hitler's visit to Finland in June 1942. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Bombing of Helsinki by Soviet planes, November 30, 1939. On this day, the USSR attacked Finland. The number of divisions is 21, the total number of soldiers is 450 thousand. The Winter War has begun. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Wounded in Helsinki. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A building on Senate Square in Helsinki is on fire. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Streets of Helsinki after the bombing. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Anti-aircraft gun in Helsinki. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Vyborg. Back then in Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Finnish armored train. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Experimental transportation of troops in cold weather. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Military dog school Hämeenlinna. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A rocket launched from the forest. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Street fighting in Medvezhyegorsk, Russia. The city was Finnish for three years. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Frozen soldier. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A soldier in a protective suit against a gas attack. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Downed Soviet plane. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Restoration of bombed tram tracks. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Two girls on the ruins of Martin's Cathedral in Turku, Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Soviet prisoners of war. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Lifting a locomotive out of the water. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Bomb shelter hospital in Mikkeli, Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Bomb strike. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Dead German soldier. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Cathedral in Vyborg after the bombing. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A thirteen-year-old boy in the hospital. (Photo by SA-kuva):
The burning village of Nurmoila, Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Finnish motorcycle and tank with swastika. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A soldier and a reindeer on the ice in northern Lapland, Finland, October 26, 1941. (Photo by SA-kuva):
